A letter from WAND president emerita Sayre Sheldon:
The New York Times of November 18 informs us that the U.S. has been spending millions for the past six years on a secret program to help Musharref keep his nuclear weapons safe. An op-ed ominously warns that we may have to use our military to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government collapses.
Great: what did we do to deserve this? Plenty, it turns out.
I can flash back to 1995 at the U.N. Non-Proliferation Conference—the fifth since the treaty was signed in 1970. I was there representing WAND as an NGO. One by one the delegates made their statements, offering condolences to the U.S. for the bombing in Oklahoma City. Behind the scenes they were saying: “Welcome to the world of terrorism. The rest of us know it well.”
The conference was mostly business as usual: by which the delegates meant that the five declared nuclear nations would continue not getting rid of their weapons while the smaller nations would secretly work to develop their own. “Do what we say, not what we do” was the mantra of the five nuclear nations but it wasn’t working anymore: the “have-nots” were getting ready to join the nuclear club.
India and Pakistan were in a nuclear arms race we were told: each busily demonizing the other, claiming they must have the capacity to deter the other—a carbon copy of the former U.S.—Soviet behavior. A young Pakistani scientist warned us that the chances of nuclear weapons being used again was growing every day and that with the world awash in nuclear materials and knowledge, future acts of terrorism could be on a scale never dreamed of. He ended his talk with “The U.S. led us into the nuclear age, now it has to lead us out.”
Without much progress, the conference did end with the decision to extend the treaty indefinitely. This bound the nuclear nations to “pursue good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.”
Three years later in 1998 India detonated its first bombs, soon to be followed by Pakistan. Amazingly, U.S. intelligence was taken by surprise. In 2002, India and Pakistan came close to a nuclear engagement over Kashmir.
The 2000 Non-Proliferation Conference showed some much-needed action: adopting 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, including the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM). The nuclear nations had so far shown no effort to reduce their weapons but they at least showed intent to do so—and in 2002 the U.S. and Russia did sign an agreement to reduce theirs weapons to several thousand each by 2012.
Five years later the world was pedaling backwards furiously with the U.S. leading the way. I went to the 2005 Conference—it was a complete failure, ending without any document. The Bush administration’s war on terrorism put nuclear weapons back into a central place in its security policies. The U.S. did not ratify the CTBT and unsigned the ABM treaty. Preventive war policies in response to 9/11 resulted in abandoning the no first use of nuclear weapons policy and the prohibition forbidding their use against non-nuclear countries. Efforts to develop new nuclear weapons as well as upgrading the old ones were narrowly voted down. To be fair, the major nuclear nations at the conference could blame the U.S for being the worst offender.while defending their own right to hang onto their weapons and do nothing about keeping their part of honoring the treaty.
Even more indefensibly, U.S. policies of supporting India’s nuclear programs made Pakistan more nervous about their own. Scandals erupted as their exporting of nuclear technologies to countries around the world was revealed. Now the Pakistan genie seems to be threatening us all and that warning of nuclear terrorism we heard first in 1995 no longer sounds so far in the future. Although we in the U.S. have to remember that our nuclear weapons, unlike Pakistan’s, are on alert—ready to go in minutes.
Sayre Sheldon, WAND National Board Member and U.N. NGO representative.